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Abstract Increasing evidence suggests that emotions
affect cognitive processes. Recent approaches have also
considered the opposite: that cognitive processes might
affect people’s mood. Here we show that performing and,
to a lesser degree, preparing for a creative thinking task
induce systematic mood swings: Divergent thinking led to
a more positive mood, whereas convergent thinking had the
opposite effect. This pattern suggests that thought pro-
cesses and mood are systematically related but the type of
relationship is process-specific.
Introduction
In contrast to the commonsense concept of affect and
reason as antagonistic factors that compete for the control
of our thoughts and actions, recent research has revealed
evidence for numerous types of fruitful cooperation
between affective and cognitive processes. For instance,
positive mood and affect have been shown to facilitate
associative (Bar, 2009) and semantic priming (Hanze &
Hesse, 1993), to enhance the recall of happy memories
(Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979), and to support the processing
of global perceptual information (Gasper & Clore, 2002);
whereas negative mood and affect have been found to
narrow the focus of attention (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson,
2007), facilitating analytical processing, causal reasoning,
and reliance on systematic processing (Pham, 2007), and to
support forgetting (MacLeod, 2002; Ba¨uml & Kuhbandner,
2009). A particularly close relationship seems to exist
between mood and creative thinking. Various authors have
assumed that positive mood enhances creativity (e.g., Isen,
1999; Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & Harackiewicz, 1996),
and numerous findings are consistent with this idea (for
reviews, see Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Davis, 2009).
At the same time, however, the type and nature of this
interaction are not well understood and mediating fac-
tors like type of task (Davis, 2009), motivational set
(Baas et al., 2008), and individual differences (Akbari
Chermahini & Hommel, 2011) can play decisive roles.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that some sort of link exists
between positive and negative mood on the one hand and
creative thought processes on the other.
One idea regarding how mood and creative processes
might interact considers mood as the cause and changes in
creativity as effect. For instance, Ashby, Isen, and Turken
(1999) assumed that mood creates particular brain states
that facilitate or interfere with particular processing oper-
ations that are required for creative thinking. More
recently, however, authors have also considered the pos-
sibility of a more reciprocal relationship between affective
and cognitive processes (Bar, 2009; Gray, 2004; Gross,
2002; Salovey, Mayer, & Caruso, 2002), which would
allow creative thought to affect mood. For instance, Bar
(2009) suggested an interactive relation between mood and
cognitive control: The broad associative activation that is
thought to coming along with positive mood may help
gaining a broader perspective, which again might make
people happier. Indeed, Srinivasan and Hanif (2011)
reported that attending to the global aspect of visual stimuli
facilitates the processing of happy as compared to sad faces
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while attending to the local aspects facilitates the pro-
cessing of sad faces. Applied to the interaction between
mood and creative thinking, this suggests that particular
mood states may not only facilitate or hinder particular
types of thought processes but some types of thought
processes might also facilitate or even induce particular
mood states.
In the present study, we tested this possibility by pre-
senting participants with creative-thinking tasks and
assessing whether this would lead to systematic mood
changes. As divergent and convergent thinking have been
attributed to different types of cognitive processes
(Guilford, 1967) and given that they seem to rely on dif-
ferent neurocognitive states (Akbari Chermahini & Hom-
mel, 2010), we tested the impact of divergent thinking
(assessed by the Alternate Uses Task, AUT: Guilford,
1967) and convergent thinking (assessed by the Remote
Associates Task, RAT: Mednick, 1962) on mood sepa-
rately by means of a between-subjects design.
Divergent-thinking tasks require participants to generate
as many target-related responses as possible, and the target
constrains the selection of possible responses rather weakly.
An example is Guilford’s (1967) AUT, which requires
participants to generate as many uses for a simple object,
such as a pen, as they can think of. Even though divergent
thinking can be considered as just one of a number of
component processes underlying creative acts (Guilford,
1967; Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010; Wallas,
1926), recent reviews have revealed that the connection
between divergent thinking and affect and mood is partic-
ularly strong and positive (Baas et al., 2008; Davis, 2009).
Hence, more positive affect and mood improve divergent
thinking. According to the reciprocity hypothesis under test,
this suggests that the divergent-thinking task can be
expected to induce a more positive mood state.
In contrast to divergent thinking, convergent thinking
requires focusing onto one possible response per item and
thus calls for a strongly constrained search process. As an
example, in Mednick’s (1962) RAT participants are pre-
sented with three concepts per trial, such as ‘‘hair’’,
‘‘stretch’’ and ‘‘time’’, and they are to identify the one
concept that fits with all three in terms of association,
meaning, or abstraction, such as ‘‘long’’ in the example. As
we have argued elsewhere (Hommel, 2011; Hommel,
Akbari Chermahini, van den Wildenberg, & Colzato,
2011), succeeding in this task is likely to require a task set
that in some sense is opposite to that implied by divergent
thinking. Indeed, recently we were able to demonstrate that
mixing convergent and divergent thinking tasks with other
laboratory tasks results in a double dissociation: while
engaging in convergent thinking facilitates subsequent
performance in tasks that require focusing on relevant
and excluding irrelevant information, divergent thinking
facilitates subsequent performance in tasks that require the
distribution of processing resources (Hommel et al., 2011).
If we assume that opposite control states are accompanied
by opposite mood states (for reasons that we elaborate in
the Discussion), the observation that divergent thinking is
related to positive mood would imply that convergent
thinking is associated with negative mood. Accordingly,
the reciprocity hypothesis would suggest that the conver-
gent-thinking task induces a more negative mood state.
A second factor we considered was whether participants
were only expecting to carry out the thinking task or
whether they actually carried it out. This manipulation
was motivated by informal observations of ours that
participants often show affective responses to the mere
announcement of the tasks that we commonly use to assess
creative thinking (the AUT and the RAT). A similar
reaction can be observed when intelligence or mathemati-
cal tasks are being announced, irrespective of the eventual
score of the participant. This suggests that such reactions
are not reflecting the individual ability or performance on
the task but some kind of stereotypical response that may
or may not be related to particular task characteristics. To
dissociate such stereotypical and/or expectation-driven
mood changes from changes that result from the actual
processes engaged by the task, we had two groups of
participants carry out the divergent or convergent thinking
task and two other groups just waiting to perform these
tasks (for about the same duration) after having been
instructed how to carry it out.
Method
Participants, design, and procedure
Eighty-four students from Leiden University volunteered in
exchange for course credit or pay. Participants were
informed that they were participating in a study on problem
solving. They were randomly assigned to one of the four
experimental groups (22 to each of the performance groups
and 20 to each of the preparation groups). Participants
underwent four tasks or measurements: an inventory
assessing their general mood (PANAS), a mood inventory
(MI1) assessing their current feeling state before working
on (or preparing for) a creativity task (either AUT or RAT),
and another version of the MI (MI2) to assess their current
feeling state after working on (or having prepared for) the
creativity task. The order of the two versions was balanced
across the participants.
The members of the four experimental groups all
worked through the PANAS, the MI1, and the final MI2,
but they differed with respect to the creativity task (see
Table 1). The first group (DT) worked on a divergent-
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thinking task (AUT), which calls for the broad association
on a particular theme (object use). The second group (pDT)
was instructed to prepare for working on the same task, but
the task was never actually performed. Analogously, the
third group (CT) worked on a convergent-thinking task
(RAT), which calls for finding one single correct response,
whereas the fourth group (pCT) was instructed to prepare
for working on the convergent-thinking task without per-
forming it. To keep the timing comparable across the four
groups, the members of groups pDT and pCT were to talk
about the experiment and the instruction of either DT or CT
with the experimenter for 5 min instead of performing the
creativity task. The items of the creativity tasks were not
presented to them.
Positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS)
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a 20-item self-report
mood scale that provides a general measure (‘‘how do you
feel generally?’’) of positive affect (PA) and negative affect
(NA). The PANAS consists of ten positive adjectives (such
as ‘‘interested’’, ‘‘alert’’, ‘‘excited’’) and ten negative
adjectives (such as ‘‘disinterested’’, ‘‘upset’’, ‘‘guilty’’)
rated on a Likert scale from 1 (very little or not at all) to 5
(very or extremely). Our Dutch version of the PANAS had
high internal consistencies for both the PA (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.84) and the NA (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80)
subscale (cf., Hill, van Boxtel, Ponds, Houx & Jolles,
2005).
Mood inventory (MI)
Two Dutch versions of the mood inventory employed by
Phillips, Bull, Adams, and Fraser (2002) and Oaksford,
Morris, Grainger, and Williams (1996), and similar to the
scale of Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987), were used to
assess the current mood before and after preparing for and
(in groups DT and CT) performing the creativity task. The
items of this inventory assess three types of mood indica-
tors (three hedonic, one physical arousal, and one worry
measure; Phillips et al., 2002). One version (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.75) used the following adjective pairs (Dutch
words are given in parentheses): happy–sad (blij–verdrie-
tig), active–exhausted (actief–uitgeput), peaceful–anxious
(verdig–angstig), carefree–serious (zorgeloos–serieus), and
energetic–somber (energiek–sloom). The second version
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) used the pairs: positive–nega-
tive (positief–negatief), lively–tired (levendig–vermoeid),
calm–uptight (kalm–opgewonden), bright–dispirited (hel-
der–serieus), and cheerful–low (vrolijk–sloom). Positive
and negative words were presented on the left and right
side of a page, respectively. Nine-point Likert scales sep-
arated the words of each pair. Participants were asked to
rate their current mood state (following Phillips et al.,
2002). For further analyses, the mood scores were reversed
for five items and then totaled for hedonic valence (items 1,
3, and 4), so that higher scores indicated more positive
mood. Physical arousal (item 2), and worry (item 5) were
scored separately.
Alternate uses task (divergent thinking)
In this task (based on Guilford, 1967, and translated into
Dutch), participants were asked to list as many possible
uses for a common household item (cup) as they can within
5 min. Responses can be scored with respect to four
aspects (flexibility, originality, fluency, and elaboration),
but given that flexibility seems to be by far the most reli-
able aspect (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Ashby,
Valentin, & Turken, 2002), we considered only flexibility
scores, which were derived from the number of different
categories being used by the participant.
Remote association task (convergent thinking)
Mednick’s Remote Associates Test (Mednick, Mednick, &
Mednick, 1964) (considered as a convergent thinking test)
was originally designed in accord with Mednick’s (1962)
associative theory of creativity. Based on this theory, the
creative thinking process consists in the formation of
associative elements into new combinations which either
meet specified requirements or are in some way useful. The
original test consists of 30 items (Mednick, 1968; Mednick
& Mednick, 1967). Each item consists of three words that
can be associated in one of several ways (e.g., time, hair,
Table 1 Sequence of events for the four experimental groups
Group Pre-test Preparation Execution Post-test
DT PANAS MI1 AUT AUT MI2
pDT PANAS MI1 AUT MI2
CT PANAS MI1 RAT RAT MI2
pCT PANAS MI1 RAT MI2
PANAS positive and negative affect schedule, MI1 mood inventory (1st), AUT alternate uses task, RAT remote association task, MI2 mood
inventory (2nd)
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and stretch), such as forming a compound word or identi-
fying a semantic associate (long). The items are con-
structed in such a way that only one solution is possible and
that the first solution that comes to mind is commonly
incorrect, which is why the test is taken to assess ‘‘remote’’
associations. Our Dutch version of the test comprised 30
items and was found to be reasonably reliable (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.85). In our study, participants were given 5 min
to complete the test.
Results
Task performance
Performance in the AUT (flexibility score: M = 5.5,
SD = 2.24) and the RAT (M = 7.09, SD = 3.25) was
good and comparable to performance in other studies using
these task versions (e.g., Akbari Chermahini & Hommel,
2010).
General mood
Table 2 provides an overview of the general mood states in
the four experimental groups, as measured by the PANAS
inventory. Two one-way ANOVAs with group as between-
subjects factor did not reveal any hint to pre-experimental
differences between the four groups with respect to either
the positive or the negative subscale of PANAS. The
groups were thus comparable.
Task-induced mood changes
Mood changes were analyzed by means of three sets of
three-way ANOVAs on the MI1 and MI2, using the
hedonic valence score, the physical arousal score, and the
worry score as dependent variables. Creativity task
(divergent thinking vs. convergent thinking) and activity
(performing and preparing) served as between-subjects
factors and timepoint (before vs. after the preparation or
performance of the creativity task: MI1 vs. MI2) as within-
subjects factor. The alpha level was 0.05.
Our actual hypotheses were tested by means of the
hedonic valence ANOVA. There were only two reliable
effects: an interaction between creativity task and time-
point, F(1,80) = 17.95, p \ 0.001, g2 = 0.18, that was
modified by a three-way interaction with activity,
F(1,80) = 4.06, p \ 0.05, g2 = 0.05. Separate ANOVAs
showed that the task-by-timepoint interaction was reliable
with performance, F(1, 42) = 17.76, p \ 0.01, g2 = 0.30,
and but not with preparation, F(1,38) = 2.85, p [ 0.05,
g2 = 0.07. As shown in Fig. 1a, performing and, to a lesser
degree, preparing for the DT task induced a more positive
mood whereas performing and, to a lesser degree, prepar-
ing for the CT task induced a more negative mood. Inter-
estingly, this pattern did not change when the individual
Table 2 Mean and standard deviations for pre-experimental general
mood states (positive and negative scales) in the four experimental
groups
State mood index Groups
DT pDT CT pCT
(n = 22) (n = 20) (n = 22) (n = 20)
PANAS-P
M 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5
SD 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
PANAS-N
M 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7
SD 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
PANAS-P PANAS positive affect subscale, PANAS-N PANAS
negative affect subscale
Fig. 1 Mood (a) and subjective physical arousal (b) as a function of
creativity task (divergent thinking = DT, convergent thinking = CT),
activity (performing and preparing the creativity task), and timepoint
(before vs. after preparation or performance of the creativity task)
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performance in the creativity tasks was entered into the
equation (as covariate) in the analyses of the performance
groups (DT and CT), which rules out an account in terms of
task difficulty and/or stress.
The analysis of the physical arousal score revealed only
one reliable effect: an interaction between creativity task
and timepoint, F(1,80) = 6.11, p \ 0.05, g2 = 0.07, even
though the three-way interaction with activity approached
significance, F(1,80) = 3.24, p = 0.07, g2 = 0.04. Sepa-
rate ANOVAs showed that the task-by-timepoint interac-
tion was reliable with performance, F(1,42) = 7.43,
p \ 0.01, g2 = 0.15, but not with preparation, F(1,38) \ 1.
As shown in Fig. 1b, the outcome showed the same pattern
as the hedonic valence data. The analysis of the worry
score did not show any reliable effect, Fs \ 1.
Discussion
The results are clear-cut. Most importantly, carrying out a
task that requires creative thinking affects people’s mood.
This provides considerable support for the idea that mood
and cognition are not only related, but also that this relation
is fully reciprocal (Bar, 2009; Gray, 2004; Gross, 2002;
Salovey et al., 2002). Moreover, divergent and convergent
thinking impact mood in opposite ways: divergent thinking
is improving one’s mood while convergent thinking is
lowering it. This dissociation is consistent with Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel’s (2010) observation that both
types of thinking are related to one’s dopamine level—the
common currency that apparently mediates the interac-
tion—but that these two relationships follow rather dif-
ferent functions. It also fits with the observation of
Hommel et al. (2011) that convergent and divergent
thinking support two different types of cognitive control.
Finally, mood changes were particularly pronounced with
actual task performance but mere preparation was also
effective to some degree. The latter observation might
suggest that divergent thinking and convergent thinking
tasks evoke different, apparently even opposite stereotyp-
ical reactions which, as in intelligence tasks, do not seem to
reflect individual performance and, thus, objective task
characteristics. However, this effect might also indicate
that preparing for divergent versus convergent thinking
foreshadows the stronger performance-related effect, for
instance because preparation involves the pre-activation of
the very task-specific sets or states that are responsible for
the mood swings that we observed. In any case, however,
actually carrying out the task and, thus, the related thinking
operations further boosts the task-specific mood changes to
a degree that goes beyond possible stereotypical responses.
From a broader perspective, the outcome pattern of
our study might be interpreted in three different ways.
According to the first, the divergent-thinking task is just
‘‘more fun’’. However, even though this account seems
particularly intuitive (and is shared by many colleagues to
whom we reported our findings), closer consideration
reveals that its logical structure and actual meaning is less
clear. To render this ‘‘fun’’ explanation more than a theo-
retically meaningless re-description of the findings, it
would be necessary to identify some sort of factor that is
responsible for the resulting fun or perceived pleasantness.
The task’s physical or structural characteristics are unlikely
candidates, as it would be difficult to argue that being
presented with three target stimuli and/or producing one
response per trial is depressing while encountering one
stimulus and/or producing a number of responses per trial
is pleasant (especially if one considers that participants in
the two preparation groups produced even more output in
the filler task). More plausible would be a factor that also
considers how participants deal with the characteristics of
the tasks. On the one hand, these might be motivational
factors reflecting the type and degree of challenge the
different tasks are posing, and the motivational state this
challenge creates. On the other hand, it might be more
cognitive factors that reflect the kind of task sets the dif-
ferent tasks require. We will discuss these two possibilities
in turn.
According to a motivational account, the different
emotional consequences of the two tasks might reflect the
differences in their demand characteristics. For instance,
one may consider that the convergent-thinking task is more
difficult than the divergent-thinking task (e.g., because it
constrains responses more and/or because it takes longer to
find a correct solution) and assume that easier tasks induce
more positive, and more difficult tasks more negative
mood. Even though this interpretation may seem intuitively
plausible, closer consideration reveals that it runs into a
number of theoretical and empirical problems. For one,
people are known to be more motivated by tasks that are
difficult but solvable than by easy tasks (for an overview,
see Weiner, 1980). If we assume that combining high
motivation and success is associated with positive mood,
this suggests that, if anything, participants should show
more positive mood after performing the convergent-
thinking task. A similar prediction could be made based on
reward-related brain processes. It is known that reward-
induced brain responses are more pronounced the more
unexpected success in a task is (Schultz, 1998). Given that
reward is commonly assumed to lead to positive affect, this
would suggest that identifying a correct response in a more
difficult task is more rewarding and, thus, induces more
positive mood than doing so in an easier task. Moreover, it
makes sense to assume that the subjective difficulty
is negatively correlated to the individual success. If so,
participants who are performing more poorly in the
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convergent-thinking task should exhibit more negative-
going mood than better-performing participants. However,
we have seen that entering individual performance into the
analysis did not explain the task-by-timepoint interaction,
which does not seem to support an account in terms of
subjective difficulty.
This motivational interpretation considers the observed
changes in mood mere byproducts of task difficulty or
related task characteristics without a particular functional
role or meaning. However, it is also possible that the mood
changes reflect the way that the cognitive system is opti-
mizing itself for the task at hand. The concept of mood
refers to the personal level of analysis and implies a person
having or being in the particular mood. At a systems level
of analysis, this ‘‘being in a particular mood’’ implies the
existence of a specific functional or neural state that cor-
responds to, and is correlated with this phenomenal expe-
rience. Probably the most systematic correlate of mood
changes are changes in the individual dopamine level
(Ashby et al., 1999), even though other neurotransmitter
systems are also likely to be involved. Indeed, there is
evidence from animal and human studies suggesting that
the processing of positive and negative events is correlated
with increases and decreases of the current dopamine level,
respectively (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2011;
Schultz, 1998). This implies that being in good or bad
mood can be considered the experiential reflection of a
brain state that, among other things, comprises an elevated
or reduced dopamine level, respectively—mood and
dopamine levels are thus two sides of the same coin.
Interestingly, the current dopamine level is systematically
related to performance in convergent- and divergent-
thinking tasks: while convergent thinking benefits from a
low level, divergent thinking is best with a medium-to-high
level (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010). This implies
that the optimal preparation for a convergent-thinking task
would indeed consist in reducing the dopamine level—
which would be accompanied by a more negative-going
mood (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2011)—while the
optimal preparation for a divergent-thinking task would
consists in elevating the dopamine level—which would be
accompanied by positive-going mood. In other words, the
task-related mood changes we observed might be the
experiential reflection of adaptive neuromodular changes
that make sure that the cognitive system is optimally pre-
pared for the task at hand.
We admit these are only speculations that call for further
investigation. But they suggest the interesting possibility
that people might be able to self-regulate their current
dopamine level by adapting mood-related brain states to
the cognitive requirements of the present task. From a more
functional perspective, this would fit the idea that mood
and cognitive control are more tightly related than
commonly thought (Bar, 2009). Mood may thus not nec-
essarily, or not only, be considered as a separable cause of
particular control states, but, rather as the phenomenal
expression of having such control states in place. In other
words, different control states may feel differently. As our
observations suggest, establishing and/or maintaining a
focused, exclusive control state may come along with
rather negative mood whereas a more distributed control
state comes with rather positive mood.
If true, this has two interesting implications. Theoreti-
cally speaking, it would support approaches to human
emotion that consider the phenomenal side effects of
emotions—how an emotion makes one feel—less impor-
tant than their functional implications—what an emotion
does for our information processing. According to such
approaches, different emotions go along with different
types of readiness for particular types of actions (Frijda,
2007; James, 1884), such as fear and avoidance behavior
(LeDoux, 1996). Our present findings suggest that this may
not only hold for overt actions and action preparation but
also for more general cognitive-control states. Practically
speaking, the apparently close link between particular
control states and particular mood states has the advantage
of providing cues to assess the control state a given person
is currently in. That is, someone’s degree of positive or
negative mood, and systematic changes therein, might
provide important information about whether he or she is in
a more focused or a more distributed control state. Given
that mood states are commonly communicated through a
broad range of perceivable cues, such as facial expression,
body posture, or verbal style, this raises the exciting pos-
sibility that we might be able to directly perceive the
control states of other people.
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